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Abstract We recommend that an auction market replace the current system for submitting
academic papers and show a strict Pareto-improvement in equilibrium. Besides the benefit
of speed, this mechanism increases the average quality of articles and journals and rewards
editors and referees for their effort. The “academic dollar” proceeds from papers sold at
auction go to authors, editors and referees of cited articles. This nonpecuniary income in-
dicates the academic impact of an article—facilitating decisions on tenure and promotion.
This auction market does not require more work of editors.
Keywords Academic journals · Academic productivity · Market design
JEL Classification A11 · D02 · D44
The Manuscript Clearing House . . . would reduce the social cost of information to
editors, authors and the subscribing public thereby generating considerable efficiency
in the production and consumption of scholarly output. By promoting competitive
bidding for manuscripts, it would equalize returns to scholarly output across ranks,
improve the efficiency of the academic job market and tend to reduce alleged discrim-
ination by journals. [. . . ] Editors would have far more information about the papers
available on the market, reducing duplication in publication, double reviewing and
delay in collating related papers.—Havrilesky (1975)
Many academics wish the Current Publishing System (CPS) worked better (Ellison 2002a,
2002b; Colander and Plum 2004), and the need to reform is growing as pressure from dif-
ferent sources increases. Junior academics need a working system to validate their aca-
demic production; senior academics may abandon a dysfunctional one (Oswald 2006;
Ellison 2007).
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Some reforms address speed: The Berkeley Electronic Press urges reviewers to work
faster (time-to-decision averaged 43 days in 2007). The Social Science Research Network
sidesteps reviewers, allowing authors to instantly distribute preprints. Others change the re-
viewer’s role: Open source peer review allows anyone to comment (Zamiska 2006); Tsang
and Frey (2006) suggest an “As-Is Review,” i.e., editors accept or reject based on referee
comments, but authors choose which revisions to make. Each of these ideas fails to ad-
dress the main problem: Giving adequate incentives to referees who must expend effort to
understand a paper well enough to improve it.
We propose auctions—with revenue sharing—to fix incentives. Although we worked out
“our” auction idea before discovering Havrilesky’s article cited above, we are pleased to find
this precedent. Our version of a competitive market differs from Havrilesky’s in its treatment
of currency (we do not use cash), payments (authors, editors and referees of cited articles
are paid; not the author of the auctioned paper), and the formalized treatment of incentives
(see the Appendix). We are also presenting this idea at a time of unprecedented pressure
on authors (for publication) and journals (for audience), a time when change is a relatively
attractive option.
The Auction Market for Journal Articles (AMJA) works as follows: In period zero, the
author writes, markets and submits his paper to the AMJA auction server. In period one,
editors screen and value papers. In period two, editors bid for papers. Winning bids—in
“academic dollars” or A$—go to the authors, editors and referees of articles cited in auc-
tioned papers. In period three, referees review papers. Editors decide to accept or reject
papers in period four. (We call accepted papers “articles” after they are published.)
Since papers do not generate A$ income unless they are cited, authors have an additional
incentive to write well. Since referees and editors share A$, they have incentives to improve
papers—rather than reject them—and to speed up the review process.
After a paper is published as an article, citation revenue is an accurate measure of its
value: A$ revenue rises in the number of citations it receives, the “quality” of the citing pa-
pers (as reflected in their auction prices), and the uniqueness of the article—if similar papers
are also cited, all papers receive lower citation revenue. It is a simple step to sum an indi-
vidual’s A$ income (from work as author, referee, and/or editor) to get an accurate signal
of academic productivity. This signal could facilitate decisions on tenure, promotion, grants
and so on. Since A$ income can map to income, prestige or some other incentive, overall
outcomes will improve. For example, experienced referees could work full time on improv-
ing others’ work (a useful division of labor that raises overall productivity) in exchange for
A$ income that can be used to gain career benefits; see Sects. 3.2 and 3.3 for more on A$.
The AMJA is new only because it applies existing ideas in a novel way. Readers familiar
with auctions and “markets” for books and movies will see familiar parallels. Auctions are
useful for the discovery of consumers’ valuations of innovative products (experience goods)
and allocate the good to the bidder with the highest willingness-to-pay (WTP). This is ef-
ficient. Currently authors of books or producers of movies can already auction their output
among publishers/distributors. The AMJA makes sure the editor with the highest WTP, who
thinks that this paper will generate the highest citation revenue in his journal (given that
he publishes it), obtains the right of publication. The author and referee of the paper also
benefit, via citation revenue.
In the next section, we describe the pros and cons of the CPS. In Sect. 2, we describe the
AMJA, compare it to the CPS, and explain how the AMJA results in faster publication of
better articles (the Appendix contains a game theoretical treatment of Sect. 2). In Sect. 3, we
discuss some aspects of the AMJA not included explicitly in the model (valuing academic
output, bidding errors, citation gaming, implementation and comparison to law reviews) and
explain how editors need not spend more time acquiring papers under the AMJA.
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1 Problems in the current publishing system
Science demands recognition of the fact that exclusive review procedures promulgated
by editors work to their and to the referees’ decided advantage, not to that of potential
authors. The basis for this policy is more one of convenience, power, and control than
ethics.—Szenberg (1994)
An editor’s job is triage, but he is unpopular since he rejects 75 percent of the sub-
missions, sends papers for review to people who are too busy and then badgers those
reviewers.—Pressman (2005)
. . . an active discussion among economists could reveal a lot about whether the cur-
rent system maximizes the utility of those involved or whether an alternate system
might make economists’ lives more enjoyable and research more productive.—Ellison
(2002b, p. 990)
In the CPS, an author chooses and submits his paper to one journal. This choice matters:
Shoot too high and suffer delay before rejection;1 shoot too low and waste an opportunity
to publish well (Oster 1980). According to Judge et al. (2007), the single most important
factor determining an article’s popularity is not how well it is written, who the author is,
or the originality of the idea—it is the prestige of the journal publishing it. If true, authors
are right to worry about appropriate placement. Unfortunately, bias in favor of their own
brilliance ensures they shoot too high more often than too low, wasting everyone’s time.
The editor receives papers pushed by authors. If the editor does not “desk reject” the
paper, he chooses one or more referees to review it. Their reviews help the editor decide to
accept or reject the paper. Although all parties to the process are trying to do the right thing,
editors and referees make mistakes in rejection (or acceptance).2 These mistakes arise from
the characteristics and incentives of the CPS: Authors push papers at editors, who have a
temporary monopoly on review by referees who receive little credit for their work.3
Let us look at the CPS from the perspectives of each actor, concentrating on the main
problem each faces.4
Readers are unhappy because the CPS is too slow—recent publications do not reflect
state-of-the-art research5—and the CPS system of matching papers to journals by quality
is too inaccurate: Although all articles in a given journal may be good, not all good arti-
cles are in that journal—readers have to search elsewhere or wait for the articles to appear
(Starbuck 2005; Chow et al. 2006; Oswald 2007). On the other hand, readers are happy be-
cause journals filter and rank articles from a much larger pool of papers—improving them
(presumably) before publication.
1The average wait for rejection is eight months; 30% of articles accepted for publication had been rejected
previously by other journals (Hamermesh 1994).
2Gans and Shepherd (1994) reported how (now) famous economists could not get their seminal articles
published.
3Ironically, one of the most widely cited articles on deadweight losses from monopoly—Tullock (1967)—
ran into this problem before it was finally published in Economic Inquiry. Tullock’s discussion of additional,
non-quantifiable welfare losses from rent seeking and lobbying is relevant to the monopoly dynamics of the
CPS.
4We ignore other parties (e.g., publishers and university administrators) to concentrate on the central players
in academic publishing.
5Publication delay may explain the increasing number and cost of conferences: conference value rises with
delay.
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Authors are unhappy because slow publishing delays decisions on tenure & precedence
and the debate, use & dispersion of their ideas: Submitting to the wrong journal increases
delay. On the other hand, authors like the control and choice they have in the CPS. They
push their papers to the journals they want. They also like getting “free” review services,
although this is a negative externality for referees and editors.6
Editors are unhappy because authors push papers at them: They choose neither the quality
nor volume of incoming papers, reject authors, affect others’ careers, struggle with referees,
are paid little, and sometimes doubt the sincerity of those who claim to be friends. On the
other hand, power and prestige benefit editors’ own research and careers.
Referees are unhappy because they work for “free:” Their reputation does not improve
because their work is usually anonymous; editors push them; and they focus on rejecting—
not improving—papers. On the other hand, referees are happy because they receive “credits”
from editors for future (favorable) treatment of their own work, “give back” to the commu-
nity; and get access to insider information.
The greatest weakness of the CPS are the poor incentives referees face, which lead them
to choose sub-optimal effort.7 Referees delay and/or avoid work, argue with each other
and fail to understand value (Szenberg 1994; Starbuck 2003; Seidl et al. 2005).8 They reject
original, significant works that conflict with conventional wisdom and favor papers that echo
their own work (Armstrong 1997, 2002). Referee reviews have a low or negative correlation
with subsequent citations; referees often miss the big picture, and over three-quarters of
their requested changes are based on “whim, bias or personal preference” (Armstrong 2002;
Starbuck 2005). If there is one thing to fix, it is referee incentives. The AMJA does.
2 The auction market for journal articles
In the last section, we introduced the four parties involved in the publication process. In
our formal model, we characterize each party by a utility function that reflects their main
costs and benefits from publication. For a game theoretical treatment of the AMJA, see the
Appendix. In this section, we describe their preferences, the AMJA structure, dynamics and
equilibrium.
Readers value article quality and publication speed. Since searching for good articles is
costly, they look for high quality articles in high quality journals. Because readers deter-
mine the subsequent popularity of articles (through downloads and/or citations), they bring
discipline to the system—punishing journals for substandard articles and rewarding journals
that deliver quality above expectations. Authors benefit from publishing high quality papers,
quickly. Before authors can realize the benefits of publication, they must exert effort in writ-
ing and marketing their papers to journals, so editors can become aware of the existence
of their paper. Editors care about the average quality of articles in their journals, but qual-
ity will only rise if they exert effort in making a preliminary review of appropriate papers,
choosing referees for papers that survive this review, and preparing papers for publication.
Referees review papers so they can improve their chances of publishing in the same journals,
6Submission is not always free. Some journals have submission charges and/or require referee reports.
7Frey (2003) argues that referees have little incentive to improve papers; he suggests that editors accept/reject
a paper before referees suggest improvements—as in the AMJA mechanism.
8Garcia-Berthou and Alcaraz (2004) found statistical errors in 38% of the articles they sampled in Nature
and the British Medical Journal. In 4% of the cases, “the conclusion would change from significant to non-
significant” [p. 3].
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as authors. They are willing to exert effort in judging and improving a paper for this benefit.
We also assume that greater effort increases publication speed.
Thus, we see that readers want referees to work harder (improving quality and speed),
that authors and editors want to match on quality, and that referees play a key role in improv-
ing matching speed and quality. These incentives are present in the CPS. The AMJA adds
an incentive—A$ revenue to authors, editors and referees—that delivers a Pareto-improved
result over the CPS. The AMJA’s benefits come with a cost—authors pay a submission fee
to cover the operating costs of the auction server.
2.1 The AMJA game
In the AMJA, authors write papers, market them to editors, and post them for auction. Ed-
itors bid Academic Dollars (A$) for papers and assign “purchases” to referees.9 Referees
put in effort to review and improve—not reject—papers. Readers read and cite articles (pub-
lished papers) in their own work. When the papers of those readers (now authors) are later
auctioned, A$ are redistributed to authors, editors and referees of cited articles as a reward
for quality. Figure 1 displays the flow of a paper and A$.
For example, Paper One is auctioned for 100A$. Since it cites ten older articles, the
authors, editors and referees of each cited article divide 10A$. When Paper Two—citing
Paper (now Article) One and 19 others—sells for 120A$, Article One’s author, editor and
referee split 6A$ according to their prior agreements. Section 3.3 discusses A$ circulation.
2.2 Analysis of the AMJA game
This section summarizes Sect. A.4, which analyzes the game by backward induction. Since
the final decision of the editor is nonstrategic—he simply chooses to publish the best papers
he has optioned on the auction market after referees have improved them—we start with
the referee’s optimization problem in the third (penultimate) period. In this period, the ref-
eree decides how much effort to put into improving the paper’s quality. Without specifying
the magnitude of that effort, we know that it will be greater than the effort exerted in the
CPS because the AMJA referee receives additional compensation (A$) in proportion to the
quality, i.e., future A$ revenue the published article receives.10
In the second period, the editor bids for papers. Because the AMJA is set up as a second-
price, sealed-bid auction (all bids are anonymized to be unique), participants cannot behave
strategically. He therefore bids according to his private value that depends on the cost of
finding a referee, the probability that the paper will turn into an article, the article’s expected
revenue to his journal, and the editor’s share of those revenues. Before bidding in period two,
the editor chooses the papers he preliminarily screens in period one. He bids on all papers
for which he finds his valuation to be positive. Before the first period, the author decides
9Throughout this article, we say that papers are purchased, optioned, and/or won at auction. It is more accurate
to say that winning bidders in the AMJA receive an exclusive, temporary option to consider a paper for
publication. Publication is not required, and ownership still resides with the author.
10Will explicit referee incentives in the AMJA crowd out implicit incentives responsible for current levels of
referee effort? Not exactly. AMJA referees are rewarded explicitly in A$ (on top of the current good feeling
from “service to society”), not cash. Since A$ act as tokens (or quasi-medals), they reinforce the “service”
reward. On the other hand, higher A$ may be positively correlated with higher real income (e.g., a better job),
which result in a second order loss of intrinsic motivation. The degree with which A$ income adds to the
existing chances of getting a better job as a referee under the CPS (potentially lowering implicit motivation)
compared to its augmentation of explicit incentives is hard to predict but probably small enough to ignore.
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Fig. 1 Market structure from
auction to publication. In Period
2, A$ auction proceeds go to
prior cited articles. The auctioned
paper receives revenue after
publication, when papers citing it
(as an article) are themselves
auctioned. Rejected papers go
back to the author
how much effort to put into writing and marketing his paper, where marketing is necessary
to increase the probability that the paper is known to editors when submitted to the auction
server.
2.3 Equilibrium and Pareto-optimality
In Sect. A.5, we show that the additional explicit incentives of the AMJA system induce
referees to put more effort into improving papers, editors to pull more papers for preliminary
review (which frees other papers from the idleness common in the CPS), and authors to put
more effort into papers’ quality and marketing. Taken together, these actions will increase
the quality of journals and reduce publication delay—for the benefit of all. We also show
that all players in the AMJA are better off on average—given that the submission fee to the
auction server is sufficiently low. In other words, the AMJA-equilibrium is strictly Pareto-
superior to the CPS-equilibrium.
3 Discussion
The culture of academics is reasonably efficient at enforcing norms of integrity, hard work
and truth, but it takes more than culture to overcome weak incentives for referees, imperfect
matching of papers to journals, monopolistic editorial controls, and imperfect measurement
of output. In The Organization of Inquiry (1966), Gordon Tullock (2005/1966) discusses the
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scholarly “ecosystem” that encourages, protects and disciplines researchers facing mixed in-
centives and vague notions of success. The AMJA-mechanism contributes to that discourse
and sharpens—via auctions and A$ distribution—the incentives for and quantification of
useful research. Tullock thought readers to be best positioned to judge the value of arti-
cles; he was less excited about the responsibility of editors as gatekeepers to publication.
The AMJA improves on the CPS by increasing competition among editors—weakening the
gatekeeper effect—and sharpening reader opinions on value—via citations. He also worried
that anonymous referees would have little reason to spend time improving papers, perhaps
passing judgement too quickly when the risk of being confronted with mistakes—like the re-
ward for success—was small. Finally, he worried that editors would economize on the time
they spent evaluating papers and the editorial risks they took [pp. 115–122]. Since referees
and editors in the AMJA receive greater benefits when an article is successful than they do
in the CPS, we believe that the AMJA does a better job at addressing these problems. In this
section, we discuss these themes and expand upon the results of the previous section, which,
in turn, summarizes the detailed analysis in the Appendix.
3.1 The editor’s workload
Although readers of this article may be excited by the prospect of faster publication of better
articles or referees working to improve—rather than reject—their papers, these aspects are
immaterial relative to the editor’s question: “Will I have to work more in an AMJA system?”
For readers of this journal, this question will be familiar. One of the fundamental princi-
ples of public choice economics is that people do their jobs not just as professionals but also
as individuals, sometimes weighing personal interests above professional ideals. In fact, we
believe that the AMJA will make an editor’s job easier without necessarily increasing his
workload.
The work of editors in the CPS has changed less than it could have in the last decades.
Specifically, editors are making much less use of information technology (IT) than optimal.
In the AMJA system, editors can use IT to filter for a preliminary set of papers (named L
in the model) to review. The key word is heuristics. Articles are now classified in many
dimensions, e.g. JEL codes, political science codes, keywords, cited articles, cited authors,
methodology, length, and so on. All of these dimensions can be searched with algorithms;
see Econlit or comparable databases. Most working papers are now formatted in the same
way, allowing them to be classified in dimensions that match academic standards. AMJA ed-
itors can take advantage of this development by specifying search criteria in any combination
of dimensions in their profile on the auction server. They would only receive email notifica-
tions when papers submitted to the auction server met their prespecified requirements, akin
to an upgraded version of today’s SSRN abstract newsletters. By restricting search criteria,
editors can indirectly limit the number of papers they see, even while improving the match
to their preferences. In contrast, the papers received under the CPS cover a much broader
set of topics. Thus, with equal effort an AMJA editor spends less time than a CPS editor on
papers that do not interest him.
Apart from this technological improvement, the AMJA makes the editor’s job easier by
replacing the current push system with a pull system.11 Say, for example, that a journal
receives 500 submissions per year and has to narrow these submissions down to 100 papers
11Hagel and Brown (2005) note the efficiency of pull models in an environment of uncertainty; Blois (2000)
states that customer pull is more efficient when suppliers market directly to customers (not via intermediaries).
This case exists in the AMJA, where authors “sell” to editors/journals, not readers.
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(top-ranked journals reject more than 90% of submissions). The editors need to sort and filter
the papers into piles—desk rejects, send to referees, find referees, and so on—and somehow
throw out 400 papers. Referees know that editors need to reject many papers, so they look for
defects. In the end, the editor is left with a pile of papers that are not bad enough to reject—
and those are published. Let us observe (without veering into psychology) that this process
is much more about unwanted, flawed, rejected papers than wanted, improved, accepted
papers.
Now consider the AMJA, where editors pull papers to themselves. As with eBay, papers
are “won,” and that positive message permeates the AMJA process. Editors participating in
auctions get to choose which papers to see, how many papers to see, which papers have
higher bids, and much else. Instead of choosing the “least worst” among papers pushed at
him, an editor chooses the best papers he sees. To cater to editors’ needs, AMJA authors
will make their papers more “accessible”—via clearer abstracts, better JEL and keyword
choices, and so on—knowing that editors are using these heuristics.
Can we prove that the AMJA need not increase an editor’s workload? Yes. We can repro-
duce the current push system within the AMJA by allowing authors to “handicap” journals
in order of their preference. An editor could then pull only those papers that give his jour-
nal the highest handicap and bid on them. He would have to compete with others, but such
competition is more likely to be helpful (via price signals) than harmful (losing a paper).
Since all editors see all papers simultaneously and bid for those they value, the AMJA
places papers more quickly and accurately. Although editors now have to fight for papers
they previously got for “free,” they also have a chance to get others’ papers. Editors can even
assemble special topic issues by emptying the market of all applicable papers.
3.2 Valuing academic output
The AMJA quantifies academic output through A$ income, and academics need an accurate
measure now more than ever. Long ago, decisions on professional advancement depended
on subjective factors. These were replaced over time by “objective” factors such as publica-
tion or citation counts. As publication has grown more important, the number of submitted
papers has increased, leading—in turn—to a greater supply of journals offering publication
spaces.12 Far from fixing the problem, the multiplication of titles has made measurement
(and professional decisions) more difficult. Neither tenure candidates nor committees are
happy with current evaluation methods (Varian 1997); they need a simple indicator.
In the CPS, academic departments may multiply articles (or pages) by the “rank” of the
publishing journal. The department may define rank (inviting provincial bias) or use ISI’s
“Impact Factor” (inviting ISI’s bias).13 A more accurate method multiplies citations of an
12When publishers (both for-profit and non-profit) realized they could issue more journals without lowering
prices—since journals are complements and not substitutes—the number of journals exploded from about 120
in 1980 to almost 300 in 2000 (Bergstrom and Bergstrom 2001; Plasmeijer 2002). EconLit lists over 1,100
at http://www.econlit.org/journal_list.html—using a more inclusive definition. Bergstrom (2001) claims that
many new journals deliver little value.
13
“The impact factor of a journal is calculated by dividing the number of current year citations to the source
items published in that journal during the previous two years. Example: A = total cites in 1992 B = 1992 cites
to articles published in 1990–91 (this is a subset of A) C = number of articles published in 1990–91 D = B/C
= 1992 impact factor” (Garfield 1994); see Kalaitzidakis et al. (2003) for another method. Thompson ISI has
a monopoly on citation tracking, mixes authors with the same first initials, is sloppy about journal inclusion,
fails to control for different journal formats, and introduces within-journal citation bias (Klein and Chiang
2004).
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author’s articles times the impact factor of the journals where citing articles appear, i.e., the
value of each article (i) depends on the number of citing articles and the impact factor of
the journals (j ) in which those articles appear. Thus, total value of an academic’s work is∑
i
∑
j Impact Factorj . The main problem with this metric is the bias within ISI’s impact
factor. An additional problem is the assumption that all articles in a journal have the same
quality as the journal’s Impact Factor. For example, a citation from an excellent article in a
“bad” journal counts for less than a citation by a terrible article in a “good” journal. This
method gives prima facie inaccurate measures of value (Chow et al. 2006; Ellison 2007;
Oswald 2007). Oswald (2006) notes growing reliance on citations is increasing the incentive
for manipulation.14
Under the AMJA, an academic’s output is the sum of his A$ earnings as an author, editor
and/or referee. The value of a journal is the sum of A$ earnings to articles that appear in
that journal. Since A$ will vary with an article’s actual academic quality, these measures
are more accurate. Thus, the impact of an article is determined endogenously in the AMJA
(via its A$ revenue), while it is exogenous to participants in ISI’s system.
3.3 A$ circulation
The AMJA uses nonpecuniary Academic Dollars (A$)—not a liquid currency like US$.
After each auction, A$ are allocated to the authors, editors and referees of cited articles in
proportion to their prior agreements. (The initial allocation of A$ may be in proportion to
subscribers, citations, impact factor, or some other variable.)
It is important to consider what happens to the A$ that pass from editors buying papers
to the authors, editors and referees of cited articles. Although receiving editors can use the
A$ to bid for new papers, authors and referees (assuming they are not also editors) cannot
spend their A$. We suggest that authors and referees be obliged to reassign their A$ to any
editor(s) they choose within, say, one year.15 Although some may choose to sell their A$
for cash, we think a significant number will enjoy the opportunity to reward their favorite
editors/journals.
Redistribution will strengthen good editors/journals and support competition to serve
the needs of authors and referees—with more votes coming from those with more success.
A$ reallocation gives journals the incentive to increase their differentiation and quality, low-
ering search costs. If the journal’s subscription price was “too high” relative to its A$ rev-
enue, it would lose readers and citations. Journals that charged “too little” could choose
between increasing price or building even higher readership.
Why would a top journal support the AMJA and take the risk of a change in its ranking?
First, top journals would receive quite a bit of A$ income from citation revenue. Second,
many top journals are non-profits run by academic societies that (on paper) serve the in-
terests of the greater community. Third, journals that do not support the AMJA risk losing
access to new papers; see Sect. 3.7. Fourth, those in power at these journals would benefit
(as authors) from the AMJA, and they may decide to enroll the journal in the AMJA.
14Some publishers have begun measuring an article’s impact by its download count—a measure that’s supe-
rior to impact factors but which omits the implicit “download” that occurs when someone reads the printed
article in its journal. Measurement by download can complement measurement by A$, which is both forward-
looking (the price of a paper at auction anticipates future revenue) and backward looking (A$ revenue comes
when the article is cited by a paper sold at auction).
15Interestingly, an editor’s limited supply of A$ might limit the practice of excessive “banking,” i.e., accepting
so many papers that “the time lag from acceptance to publication [rises] to 30 months or even three years”
Dunleavy (2003, pp. 231–2).
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In the CPS, it only takes money and an editorial board to start a new journal, and publish-
ers have started many new journals. Although these journals are profitable for the publishers,
they have fragmented the market into niches that deliver few benefits to readers, dubious
benefits to authors, and budget problems to research libraries (Bergstrom and Bergstrom
2001, 2004).
Because it would be difficult to start a journal without A$ in the AMJA, “hot” money
publishers would be thwarted. Entry would instead occur when authors/referees pooled their
A$ to support a new journal. (Minority and heterodox editors could benefit from a relatively
loyal constituency.)
Exit occurs when a journal fails to garner A$ support from authors/referees. Both for-
profit and non-profit journals would need A$ revenues if they are not to fail from “aca-
demic unprofitability”. Although wealthier journals could buy A$ on a black market—
strengthening their bidding power—they would lose power if they did not receive equal
A$ revenue.
The fixed supply of A$, reallocation norm and trading costs are likely to limit the im-
portance of cash in an A$ black market. A cash AMJA would suffer from many problems
(inflation, hot money entry, high-powered incentives) and offer few—if any—benefits. By
using A$, we avoid the problems of high powered-incentives—encouraging cash profits over
academic knowledge—and support those who produce value within the publication system
(Besley and Ghatak 2005).
3.4 Bidding errors
An editor’s desk review assigns values to some papers from a larger set. Errors in establish-
ing these values—due to mistakes in the editor’s judgement and/or stochastic elements in
eventual, realized demand—means that they vary from the true quality (value). An editor
who overestimates a paper’s published value as an article is more likely to win a paper by
bidding too high and less likely to a paper when his negative error leads him to underestimate
a paper’s value.
In the CPS, editors benefit from referee comments when considering value.16 AMJA
editors only receive this benefit if they win the paper at auction. Holding all else constant,
an editor in the AMJA looking at the same set of papers as the editor in the CPS is more
likely to miss a few good ones and accept a few bad ones.
The cost of these mistakes in the AMJA is trivial: The auction price is slightly lower
(higher) for papers where the second price bid is under (over) biased. Since the real value
of the paper comes from future citations, an inaccurate bid only affects revenue to cited
articles.17 If the average article is cited a number of times, these errors cancel out. For
editors, mistakes in over and underbidding will, similarly, balance out if other editors make
mistakes at the same rate. An editor who makes too many mistakes exits in the long run. For
the author, a mistake means placement in one journal and not another, but this effect will
be small when displacement is only a few ranks up/down the journal ladder; it disappears
completely if the paper ends up in a horizontally-equivalent journal or if readers read it à la
carte.
16The CPS advantage comes at a cost, since referees spend time (a negative externality) on all forwarded pa-
pers. CPS editor errors matter on the margin, when they desk-reject papers that should have gone to referees.
17It is for this reason that we do not have to worry about editors who win “bad” papers. Even if the paper is
published—no sure thing—its value depends on the A$ price of subsequent papers that cite it. If these papers
point out how bad the article is but are not good themselves, then they will sell for low A$ values, which
means that the cited “bad” article will earn little A$ revenue.
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In the CPS, the problem of under-estimated value is greater because the wait for rejection
is so long. In the AMJA, more eyeballs means fewer Type-I (mistaken acceptance) and Type-
II (mistaken rejection) errors; see, e.g., Gans and Shepherd (1994) and Oswald (2007).
3.5 Gaming citations
Although authors face stronger incentives to trade citations (“you cite me, I cite you”) in the
AMJA, gaming the AMJA is harder because the value of an article depends on the auction
prices of citing papers, not just the number of citing papers.18
Self-citations would not count in calculating the division of auction revenue for a paper.
Citations of friends/colleagues/co-authors would count, since determining the difference be-
tween legitimate and undeserved citations would be difficult.19 Over-citing would decrease
if citing authors want to maximize “rewards” to prior contributions they admire; under-citing
[plagiarism] would decrease if overlooked authors have a reason (A$) to see their contribu-
tions acknowledged. Papers without citations are rare; if one were to sell at auction, the
revenue could be distributed to all journals on some ex ante, pro rata basis.
Works cited that originate outside the auction system (books, unpublished papers, articles
from other disciplines, newspapers, and other works) would not receive citation revenue.
Authors of these works could track “what if” A$ revenues to understand the opportunity
cost of non-participation; AMJA managers could use “what if” A$ to indicate areas where
the AMJA should expand with the most benefit.
3.6 Multiple submissions
Although the AMJA resembles the multiple submission system common to law reviews,
it differs in important ways, as summarized in Table 1.20 Pressman (1994) argues against
multiple submissions, claiming that publication times are not reduced (because reviews have
limited publication space); initial acceptance is delayed (because authors use acceptance by
one review to motivate another review); and referee effort lowered (because probability of
publication is lower).
Pressman’s criticisms do not apply to the AMJA, since editors bid for papers only when
they want to fill publication space; authors cannot game editors with a fixed deadline; refer-
ees only review papers editors hold exclusively; and referees gain from a paper’s success.
3.7 Transition from the CPS
Given that economics journals have the longest publishing delays, the natural place to imple-
ment this idea is within economics (Ellison 2002a, p. 998). How do we know it will work?
18Thus, an AMJA author who trades citations with other authors gains benefits (A$ income) in direct pro-
portion to the auction prices of those citing papers. Since those prices are exogenous, he is uncertain what
is being traded in the shadow market. The likely result is that a researcher capable of writing good/popular
papers will only trade citations with researchers whose publication prospects are at least as good as his own,
and citation trading will only occur at the same quality level in equilibrium. Such trading may increase ab-
solute A$ income at each “quality cluster” of researchers, but it is unlikely to distort relative income ranking.
Hence, the truthful ranking of researchers—the ultimate goal of our publication system—would be accurate.
19Although this allowance makes the practice of quid pro quo citations possible, that problem already exists
in the CPS.
20Book publishers and universities handle multiple submissions for books and student applications, respec-
tively. Peters (1976) was the earliest proponent (we found) of multiple submissions for academic journals.
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Table 1 Comparing multiple
submission to auctions Multiple submissions Auctions
Participation Push (Mandatory) Pull (Voluntary)
Competition Secret Open
Deadline None Predetermined
Allocation Author’s Choice Highest Bidder
Reviewer Effort Often Wasted Rewarded
How can it be better than what we have? These worries, along with the fears that participants
would game citation credits and that academics are adverse to being measured—are perhaps
over-cautious. Gaming already happens and measurement is already abused (Oswald 2006).
One or more journals might implement a pilot program by pooling submissions and then
allowing assistant editors to bid against each other. If a number of journals wanted to begin
an AMJA unilaterally, they could return auction revenue to participating journals only. Other
journals would have to agree to pool some or all of their submissions in the auction to receive
“their share” of citation revenue. The potential for A$ income is highest for journals with
stronger catalogs, providing a useful incentive for them to join the AMJA earlier. Early
support is especially valuable, since the AMJA has network effects/increasing returns to
scale technology.21
4 Conclusion
We explore an auction market for journal articles (AMJA) that allows editors to bid for the
papers they want, increasing the speed and accuracy of matching papers to journals. Because
the AMJA sends A$ revenue to articles cited by auctioned papers, it rewards (and quantifies
the contribution of) the authors, editors and referees of those articles. Because editors pull
papers toward them in the auction (contra the push method in the current publishing system,
or CPS) and referees are rewarded when an article they reviewed is cited, the AMJA changes
incentives such that referees look for ways to improve—not reject—papers. In the short run,
A$ income to authors, referees and editors quantifies their academic contribution. In the
long run, the recirculation of A$ (from authors and referees to those editors/journals they
prefer) rewards journal quality. Although these benefits are appealing, some readers may
worry that they are offset by even greater costs. We show in a formal model that readers,
authors, editors and referees gain from moving from the CPS to the AMJA.
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Appendix: A model of the AMJA
We define variables and parameters with all subscripts; in later use, we drop subscripts
whenever possible to reduce clutter.
A.1 Induced utility and cost functions
We characterize the induced utility functions of the four parties involved in the publication
process by quantifying the main arguments mentioned in Sect. 1. The reader/consumer C
values article quality and publication speed, i.e.,
νC = uC(Qj ,Tj ), (1)
where the utility of reading articles (uC ) is increasing in the average quality of articles in
journal j (Qj ) and decreasing in publication speed of journal j (Tj ).
We assume that any competitive publication system—in equilibrium—publishes high
quality papers in high reputation journals; this condition solves the reader’s asymmetric
information problem, i.e., judging the quality of an article before he spends a reasonable
amount of time reading it.22 We also assume that the career prospects of author i depend
positively on the reputation of a journal publishing article i; see Judge et al. (2007).23 Hence,
author i prefers to produce a paper with high quality.24 He also prefers speedy publication,
i.e., low Tj . For production of a paper with quality qi and marketing the paper with effort
mi , the author bears costs of ai(qi,mi), which are convex in both arguments.25 The author’s
induced utility is:
νi = ui(qi, Tj ) − ai(qi,mi). (2)
Editor j values the power and prestige of his journal, which is a function of average article
quality (Qj ).26 The editor incurs costs in his job: the cost of preliminary review for submitted
papers (sj ), the cost of choosing a referee for papers that survive preliminary review (rj ),
and the cost of finalizing papers for publication (fj ). We assume cost functions sj (·), rj (·)
and fj (·) are convex in the number of papers at each stage to reflect increasing opportunity
costs. Thus, the editor’s induced utility function is:
νj = uj (Qj ) − [sj (·) + rj (·) + fj (·)]. (3)
22If the reputation ranking of a journal is a rough indicator of the quality of its articles, journals provide a
public good to the academic community, i.e., paper preselection and vertical classification. (This is a public
good because the journal publishers cannot charge every consumer of the good. All readers can see the table
of contents at little or no cost.)
23We assume that author and paper are paired only with each other; thus we refer to both with the same
subscript i.
24Many authors produce high quality for other, extrinsic or intrinsic reasons. Since these reasons complement
career goals, we ignore them.
25Marketing refers to presenting at conferences or seminars, sending emails, posting to preprint servers and
listservs, soliciting reviews from colleagues, and so on Armstrong (2002, p. 78). Costs of quality production
and marketing are convex because of increasing opportunity costs, e.g., time away from other work.
26We assume that editor and journal are paired only with each other; thus we refer to both with the same
subscript j .
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Referee R of journal j obtains utility uR from expected preferential treatment for his next
submission to that journal. A referee can invest effort e ≥ e > 0 in judging and improving a
paper for a cost represented by the convex function cR(e). e is the minimum effort necessary
to deliver a referee report that satisfies the editor; i.e., we assume the editor and referee both
know when a report is unsatisfactory. Since one characteristic of report quality is speed,
we assume that higher e speeds publication, i.e., dT
de
< 0. uR is positively dependent and
concave in e. The induced utility of a referee is:
νR = uR(e) − cR(e). (4)
A.2 The auction market for journal articles (AMJA) game
The detailed timing of auctions is as follows:
Period t0—author writes/markets paper:
Author i writes paper i with quality qi ≡ q for a cost of a(q) and makes the exogenous deci-
sion to post it on the auction server, for an exogenous submission fee of φ (in US$, not A$).
The author specifies: a reserve price; positive/negative “handicaps” on bids from particular
journals in A$, which allow the author to signal specific journals they find (in)appropriate
for paper i;27 the maximum time he will wait for a final acceptance/rejection decision from
the editor who wins the paper at auction; a minimum share of future revenues from the
article; and whether to remain anonymous.
Since authors specify these five criteria outside of the game, we treat the author’s share
of future revenues from the article (1 − α) and total time from submission of a paper to the
auction server to final acceptance/rejection decision (T ) as exogenous variables that can be
set by the non-strategic organizer of the auction platform.28 The author decides marketing
effort (m), which has a cost of a(m).
Period t1—editor screens papers:
Editor j of journal j already knows about the set Kj ≡ K papers, where K is a random draw
from the much larger set (∞) available on the auction market; see Fig. 2. He decides |L|,
the number of papers in set L ⊆ K , at a cost of s(|L|). In doing so, he learns his willingness
to pay (vij ≡ v) for each of the |L| papers. v depends on the expected revenue of an article
27Hence the signalling provided by author self-selection to journal j in the CPS could be imitated—but
without the restrictive quality of the CPS signal preventing consideration of paper i at journal k = j . Unique
handicaps would prevent ties among journals.
28Diversity in these variables can correct for author and editor/journal heterogeneity. Duration T could
be split into a standard duration (T1) for the auction and a standard duration (T2) for the editors accep-
tance/rejection decision. Standardization at the auction server could minimize transaction costs, but flexible
T s allow for various heterogeneities. Auctions should be frequent enough to allow editors several chances to
fill each issue of the journal. Although T2 might exceed the lapse between auctions, we do not consider inter-
auction dependencies here. Also note that AMJA authors only wait until T to learn of acceptance/rejection,
unlike in the CPS, where rejection leads to resubmission elsewhere and a longer wait. Even if T lasts as
long as the average review period in the CPS, placement under the AMJA is already optimal—in terms of
expectations. The author of a paper that receives no bids during T1 will clearly understand that he needs to
invest more in quality and/or marketing—a signal that rejection in the CPS does not produce.
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Fig. 2 In the CPS [left], editor j makes a preliminary review of subset W in the set of submitted papers N .
He sends a subset H ⊆ W to referees for review and accepts X ⊆ H . In the AMJA [right], each editor has a
set K of “known” papers in the much larger set (∞) available on the auction market. He “learns” about (and
sets a value on) an endogenous subset L. He wins a subset (M ⊆ L) at auctions and sends them to referees
and accepts X ⊆ M
(πˆ ), which differs among editors and is drawn from an arbitrary distribution.29 Let μ denote
the probability that the editor’s valuation is positive, i.e., Prob{v > 0} ≡ μ.30 We define that
the valuation of an editor for a paper is positive (v > 0) if he would publish it given that he
has page space. Such a prior is only possible after the editor spends s(·) looking at the paper.
Even if such a paper is won at auction, it may not be published if it must compete for space
with another paper of higher expected value.
Period t2—editor bids on papers:
Editor j submits a single bid of bij ≡ b for each paper in L. A$ bids are not published. This
sealed-bid, second-price (Vickrey) auction ends at the pre-specified time after which the
highest and the second-highest bids are known. The highest bidder wins and pays the price
p = bˆ, where bˆ is the second-highest bid.31 p is distributed equally among the editors of the
articles cited by i (who then split their shares with referees and authors of those articles).
Editor j wins a set of papers M ⊆ L.32 He has the right to accept or reject those papers
before T ends.
Period t3—referee reviews paper:
The editor incurs costs r(|M|) to find a referee willing to review the papers he has optioned
for a share (β) of future revenues (πij ≡ π )—should the editor publish the paper.33 The ref-
eree chooses effort e to judge/improve the paper and recommend its acceptance or rejection.
29To avoid combinatorial issues we assume that editor j ′s valuation for paper i does not depend on his
valuation for paper l = i. If an editor wants to bid on related papers (e.g., to publish a one topic issue), he
could increase his valuation for paper i by adding a value component to πˆ that depends on his expected
probability of winning the other papers. Alternatively, papers could be bundled at auction.
30The probability for positive valuations varies among editors: An editor of a high-quality journal might not
want to publish the same paper an editor of a lower-quality journal would; see more about private values on
page 396.
31These auction rules guarantee maximum anonymity of bidders and bids—and thereby solve the typical
problems of auctions with common or affiliated values and sniping; see Sect. A.4 for more details. Without
loss of generality we also use bˆ to denote the expected bid of the second-highest bidder.
32Authors pre-specify the bidders they would refuse via Period 0 handicaps.
33We assume β , like α, is exogenous. In practice, β may result from a bargaining process that integrates
referees’ heterogeneous quality and standing.
394 Public Choice (2010) 145: 379–403
Period t4—editor accepts/rejects paper:
We define X as the set of papers accepted for publication in a given issue of journal j and
|X| as the exogenously-given number of slots available for articles.34 Given |X|, we define γ
as the share of papers the editor can accept out of the |M| won at auction, i.e., |X| ≡ γ |M|.35
The editor accepts and finalizes for publication the best γ |M| papers at a cost of f (γ |M|);
he rejects (1 − γ )|M|, which go back to authors who may improve and resubmit them to
the auction server. This decision involves no additional effort and therefore no optimization
tradeoff.
A.3 Quality production and article revenues
Before we solve the AMJA Game, let us specify Qj ≡ Q, the average quality of accepted
papers in journal j .36 Q is a function of the quality of papers authors submit to the auction
(q), referee effort (e), and the journal’s acceptance rate (γ ). As Q is the average quality of
papers in X, a subset of ∞, in expectation it depends positively on qi , a single paper’s qual-
ity, where i ∈ ∞. As the increased quality of an individual paper translates monotonically
into increased average journal quality, we assume that q has a non-convex impact on Q.
As a referee’s work can increase a paper’s final quality and substitute partly for its original
quality, e has a similar effect on Q as q .
The editor can rank the |M| papers he has optioned for publication after spending s(·),
r(·) and reading referee reports. As long as he chooses to publish the best of those papers,
which is in his interest, a lower acceptance rate (γ ) results in higher average journal quality,
ceteris paribus. For simplicity, we assume a linear relation such that γ depends positively on
the exogenous number of slots in a given journal issue (|X|) and negatively on the number
of papers the editor options in the auction market (|M|). We assume |M| increases monoton-
ically in |L|, the number of papers an editor bids on, because each non-zero bid increases
the probability of placing the highest bid for a paper and winning its auction.37 Formally,
we operate with the following Equations:













34We ignore the fact that papers differ in length.
35We will refer to γ also as the “acceptance rate”. Note that this rate is different from the CPS acceptance
rate, which equals |X||N | .
36This definition allows us to use Q as the “quality of journal j” as well.
37If editor j spends s′ on paper i and learns that his valuation v = 0, he has a dominant strategy of bidding
b = 0. As the editor’s prior on his expected valuation for a given paper in K must be positive (otherwise
he would be a useless editor), a marginal increase in |L|—while assuming that the quality standards of the
editor, expressed by μ, are constant in |L|—increases the probability of finding a paper on the auction market
for which v > 0. For each such paper, as we will see below, his optimal bidding strategy is b∗ > 0. Combine
this with our assumption that the sets of known papers of editors j and k (Kj and Kk =j ) are random draws
from ∞. (Thus prob{Kj ≡ Kk =j } = 0.) We conclude that an increase in |L| increases the probability that
editor j places the highest bid for a paper and thereby increases |M|.
















d|L|2 = 0. (9)
Equation (5) characterizes the production function of journal quality. Equations (6), (7) and
(9) capture the marginal effects of the efforts of authors, referees and editors on the produc-
tion of journal quality. Equation (8) is necessary to understand (9).
We make the crucial assumption—following Judge et al. (2007)—that an article’s citation
revenues increase monotonically in the quality of the journal in which it appears. Formally,
let i be one of G papers that cites article ij , let pi be the price of i in a future auction, and
let ni be the number of articles cited in i. Then, abstracting from time discounting, article ij







As revenues will be made in the uncertain future, we denote the expected revenues of article












Summarizing Equations (6), (7), (9) and (11), we get:
Lemma 1 (Expected revenues of an accepted paper) The expected revenue of an article (πˆ )
is increasing in the quality of the paper an author submits to the auction (q), the effort of a
referee to improve the paper (e), and the number of papers an editor chooses to learn about
(|L|).
A.4 Analysis of the AMJA game
We ignore the possibility of zero strategies and look for a subgame perfect equilibrium that
provides positive outcomes.39 Since there is no optimization in t4, we start with the referee’s
optimization problem in t3 where the referee faces a moral hazard problem concerning ac-
ceptance or rejection of the paper he is to review: Since he will only get a payoff if the paper
38We assume non-convexity to reflect the fact that journals do not have increasing returns to scale. This is
evident in the emergence of more, not bigger, journals in response to the multiplication of fields and demand
for publication space. The most recent manifestation is the AER’s spawning of four field journals.
39One obvious subgame perfect equilibrium of the AMJA game is a strategy combination in which no party
exerts any effort, i.e., a zero equilibrium where authors invest q = m = 0; editors learn about |L| = 0 papers
and bid b = 0 for each paper in an empty set L; referees pick e = e but suffer no refereeing disutility because
editors send them no papers. No papers are published, and all four parties enjoy induced utility of zero.
Nobody has an incentive to deviate as it is only feasible to publish papers cooperatively.
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is published (and cited), he is unlikely to recommend rejection.40 If so, the editor making
acceptance decisions in t4 could use his own ranking of papers within |M| that he got from
spending s ′(·) in t1 and could compare the arguments the referee provides with the argu-
ments of another referee in favor of another paper. We conclude that the recommendation of
the referee in a one-shot game does not contain useful information for the editor. This does
not imply that the referee is useless: He improves the quality of the paper.
Recall that α is the journal’s share of future revenue πˆ for an article published with
the expected probability γˆ , of which the editor gives the share β to the referee. This share
extends the objective function of the referee in (4). Therefore, the referee chooses effort e∗
to solve the optimization problem:
max
e
γˆ αβπˆ(e, ·) − cR(e) + uR(e), subject to e ≥ e. (13)
We know that referees work (choose positive effort) without explicit remuneration in the
CPS. Consequently we must have uR(e) ≥ cR(e).41 As the AMJA only adds utility to exist-
ing CPS utility—from the same work, we have:
γˆ αβπˆ(e, ·) + uR(e) > cR(e). (14)
We know from Lemma 1 that πˆ is increasing in e. From (7) and (12), we know the LHS of
(14) is concave in e; the RHS, by assumption, is convex. This yields:
Lemma 2 (Effort of the referee) The optimization problem of the referee, (13), has a unique
and well defined solution, e∗ > e.
In period t2 the editor bids for papers. The value of a paper comes from two properties:
a private value for editors of certain journals and a common value for all editors. Without
knowing the mix of private and common values, a bidder does not have enough information
to estimate the common value component. Thus, we treat the value of a paper as a random
variable whose realizations are i.i.d. Editor j ’s realization of the random variable is his
private information. For simplicity, we specify that editors bid in a sealed-bid second-price
auction.42
Given that editors may bid for several papers at once and that they face A$ budget con-
straints, our setting is a private-value, sealed-bid, second-price auction with budget con-
straints and multiple objects. Che and Gale (1998) have analyzed such a setting for a single
object. They find that it is optimal for a bidder to bid the lower of his valuation for the ob-
ject and his budget. In other words, if the budget constraint is not binding, a bidder bids his
40In a repeated version of the game such a proposed pooling equilibrium, where all referees recommend
acceptance, is not necessarily stable; referees could build a reputation for honesty and seriousness by rejecting
a higher share of papers without effort; see Mailath and Samuelson (2006) for modeling possibilities that we
ignore here.
41This is a corollary to maximizing (13) when πˆ = 0.
42 A sealed-bid auction does not rule out the existence of common values: all editors want good papers.
Milgrom (1981) has shown that sealed-bid auctions prevent bidders from learning common values through
others’ bids, resulting in lower bids (to avoid winner’s curse) and sub-maximal revenue. Since this character-
istic affects all papers equally, and relative incomes do not change, we can ignore it. (Recall that our goal is
to allocate papers and value articles—not maximize revenues.)
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private value v. If the budget constraint is binding, he bids his entire budget.43 This implies
that, if the editor runs out of A$, he simply has to stop bidding for further papers. With
respect to multiple objects (papers), we make use of each editor’s uncertain knowledge of
other editors’ budgets.44 Because no editor knows the number or financial strength of other
bidding editors, he has no reason to deviate from the single object equilibrium strategy.
Finally, sealed bids also prevent shill bidding and sniping.45
An editor’s private value v depends on the expected revenues of an article (πˆ ), the editor’s
share of those revenues (α(1 − β)), the probability that a purchased paper will be published
(γ ), and the cost of finding a referee (r ′(·)). As r(|M|) is convex, the editor estimates the
number of papers he will win as a function of the number of positive bids, μ|L|.
Let ˆ|M| denote the expected number of papers the editor wins using his equilibrium
strategy. Since auctions for all papers run simultaneously within one period, the editor in
equilibrium will attribute the average cost of refereeing ( r( ˆ|M|)|Mˆ| ) to each paper. We assume
that the editor can bid his budget w this period. We also assume that he cannot go bankrupt,
i.e., bid more than w for all papers. The editor decides one bid at a time and compares
his valuation for that paper v with w, his budget remaining after earlier bids have been
subtracted. We establish:
Lemma 3 (Editor bidding) The optimal bid of editor j on each paper in L is
(i) b∗ = 0 if v ≤ 0 and
(ii) b∗ = v = γα(1 − β)πˆ − r( ˆ|M|)|Mˆ| if w > v > 0 and
(iii) b∗ = w if w ≤ v.
Before the editor bids in period t1, he decides to give a preliminary review to |L| papers.
He learns his valuation (v) for all |L| at a total cost of s(|L|). His decision on |L| affects
the expected number of purchased papers (|Mˆ|) and hence the cost of choosing suitable






α(1 − β)πˆ(|L|)] −
∑
|Mˆ|
p + uj (Q(|L|)) −
[




where α(1 − β)πˆ is the editor’s share of expected total revenues of one of |X| papers pub-
lished as articles and
∑
|Mˆ| p = |Mˆ|bˆ denotes the expected price the editor has to pay at
auctions for the right to publish |Mˆ| papers. Note that f (|X|) is independent of |L|. The
43Benoît and Krishna (2001) show that this result changes if objects have common values and information
is complete. Che and Gale (1998) also show that binding budget constraints do indeed affect the revenue
equivalence between first-price and second-price auctions. As mentioned in footnote 42, this is not of our
concern here.
44See Sect. 3.3 for the idea that authors and referees may reassign their A$ to editors after some time. If this
happens in anonymity, nobody can guess a certain editor’s budget precisely.
45Shill bidding occurs when someone bids for the author to drive prices up. Sniping occurs when someone
bids just before the auction ends—and before others have a chance to react—and wins (Roth and Ockenfels
2002).
46See footnote 37 for more on the relation between |L| and |M|.
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first order condition of (15) is:












Since (9), (11) and (12) imply non-convex growth of πˆ and linear growth of uj and |Mˆ| in
|L|, and s(|L|) and r(|Mˆ|) are convex, we can state:
Lemma 4 (Editor’s optimal set of pulled papers) The optimization problem of the editor,
(15), has a unique and well defined solution, |L|∗ > 0.
In period t0 authors decide their effort in marketing papers to editors. Let κi = mi|K ′
j
|+mi ≡
κ , the probability that paper i is among the papers known to editor j , where |K ′j | is the
number of papers known to editor j before author i’s marketing decision. It follows that
κ(m = 0) = 0, and κ is concave in m. Given paper i ∈ K , the probability that it is also an
element of L is |L||K| , and the probability that j makes a positive bid for a paper in L is μ.
Finally, only γ of the papers purchased by editor j will be published and have a positive
expected revenue.
Let us define the expected publication probability of paper i (i.e., i’s aggregate proba-
bility over all journals j of receiving a bid b > 0, multiplied by the expected probability of





κ(m, |K ′j |) ·
|Lj |
|Kj | · μj
)
γˆk ≡ ρ. (17)
Author i considers all these factors in solving the maximization problem:
max
m,q
ρ[1 − α]πˆ (q, ·) + ui(q, T ) − a(m,q) − φ, (18)
which has first order conditions of:
∑
j
( |K ′j |
(|K ′j | + m)2
· |Lj ||Kj | · μj
)
γˆk[1 − α]πˆ = da(m, ·)
dm
(19)









πˆ is independent of m; hence the LHS of Equation (19) is decreasing in mi , while its RHS
is increasing by the convexity assumption. Due to (6) and (12), the LHS of (20) is not
increasing in q , while its RHS is increasing by assumption. Thus we establish:
Lemma 5 (Author’s optimal efforts to produce quality and marketing) The optimization
problem of the author, (18), has one unique and well defined solution, q∗ > 0 and m∗ > 0.
47One could claim that μj depends positively on qi or negatively on Qj of the last round. Since we already
included effects of higher paper quality in πˆ , we assume μj is a fixed parameter.
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Notice that the LHS of (19) depends on πˆ , which depends on q . Increased paper quality q
has a positive effect on optimal marketing effort m∗. Similarly, according to the LHS of (20),
the author’s marginal expected revenue from increasing quality q increases in marketing
effort m (because dρ
dm
> 0), i.e., optimal quality q∗ grows in m. Put another way, quality and
marketing are complements in the AMJA author’s objective function—something that is not
necessarily true in the CPS. We summarize our results as:
Proposition 1 (Equilibrium of the AMJA publishing system) Consider Lemmas 2 through
5. The unique, non-zero, subgame perfect equilibrium of the AMJA game is characterized
by the strategies e∗, b∗, |L|∗, q∗ and m∗.
A.5 Comparing the CPS and AMJA
A.5.1 The equilibrium of the CPS
First, we characterize the equilibrium of the current publishing system (CPS). Consider the
induced utility functions from Sect. A.1: Equation (4) denotes the objective function of
a CPS referee. If we assume uR(e) is concave and cR(e) is convex in e, the equilibrium
strategy of a referee in a functioning CPS (i.e., uR(e) ≥ cR(e)) is to choose effort of:48
e˜ ≥ e. (21)
A CPS editor’s objective function is (3). He chooses a set of papers (W ) from the exogenous
set of papers pushed at him (N ) and gives them preliminary reviews—at a cost s(|W |)—
within period T . Naturally, we assume the effects of |W | on |H | (the number of papers being
sent to referees—and hence on γ and Q—to be the same as those effects of |L| on |M|; see
(9). If we assume uj is linear in |W | and s(·) + r(·) is convex in |W |, a unique solution to
his maximization is:
|W˜ | > 0. (22)
In the CPS, an author’s marketing effort does not improve the quality of his paper, the
only measure relevant when rational editors consider papers pushed at them. This is why
ui is independent of m in a CPS author’s objective function, (2). Consequently, equilibrium
marketing effort is:49
m˜ = 0. (23)
In contrast, q has a positive, non-convex impact on Q, which the editor values positively;
see (6). ui(q, T ) is therefore non-convex in q . Since the costs of quality (a(q)) are convex
in q , the unique equilibrium strategy is:
q˜ > 0. (24)
Since there is no auction in the CPS, there is no bidding strategy. Our benchmark case for
the subsequent comparison is thus:
48We will denote equilibrium CPS values with a tilde, e.g., e˜.
49Alternatively, one could claim that (as in reality) CPS authors also spend effort on marketing papers, i.e.,
m˜ > 0. This marketing would increase the normalized marketing level and thus m∗; since the effect influences
both systems equally, it is irrelevant.
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Proposition 2 (Equilibrium of the current publishing system) Consider (21) through (24).
A unique non-zero, subgame-perfect equilibrium in the CPS is characterized by the strate-
gies e˜, |W˜ |, m˜ and q˜ .
A.5.2 Comparing equilibria
Compare the referee’s objective function in the CPS, (4), to his objective function in the
AMJA, (13). The only difference is that the referee gets additional utility in the AMJA, i.e.,
γˆ αβπˆ(e, ·). Since dγˆ αβπˆ(e,·)
de
> 0, the referee’s equilibrium strategy in the AMJA is:
e∗ > e˜. (25)
The comparison for editors is more complicated. To compare |W˜ | and |L|∗, rewrite the




α(1 − β)πˆ(|L|)] − |M|bˆ + uj (Q(|L|)) −
[
s(|L|) + r(|Mˆ|(|Lj |)) + f (|X|)
]
. (26)
Next, use |M| = |X|
γ
and replace bˆ (the maximum price that editor j could have to pay
for each purchased paper) with his valuation v = γα(1 − β)πˆ − r( ˆ|M|)|Mˆ| ; see Lemma 3.50




|Mˆ| + uj (Q(|L|)) − (s(|L|) + r(|Mˆ(|L|)|) + f (X)). (27)
Note that the CPS editor’s objective function, (3), lacks |X|
γ
r(|Mˆ|)
|Mˆ| . When calculating the FOC
of (27), note that dγ
d|L| < 0 (hence |X|γ increases in |L|) and that r(|Mˆ|)|Mˆ| also increases in |L|
(from the convexity of r(·)). Consequently, an editor gains more utility at the margin from
increasing |L| in AMJA than from increasing |W | in CPS. This leads to:
|L|∗ > |W˜ |. (28)
For authors, compare the FOC of (2) within the CPS to (20) within the AMJA. The only
difference is that increasing quality gives the author in the AMJA an additional marginal
benefit of:





which is positive for m∗ > 0. This provides us with the insight that:
q∗ > q˜. (30)
Finally, we state as a corollary to Lemma 5 and (23) that:
m∗ > m˜. (31)
These insights allow us to state two further results:
50For every price p < v the editor’s incentive to increase |L| is even more pronounced.
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1. According to (6) to (9), the average quality of articles in a journal (Q) increases in q , e,
and |L|. Consequently, by considering the comparative results of (25), (28) and (30), we
have:51
Q∗ > Q˜. (32)
2. With e∗ > e˜ and, by assumption, dT
de
< 0, we have:
T ∗ < T˜ . (33)
These results complete our equilibrium analysis.
A.5.3 Pareto-optimality
What claims can we make from our results about the well being of authors, editors, referees
and readers? Ignoring the transition from one system to another (see Sect. 3.7), we compare
the expected, induced utility of each party in both systems.
Readers are better off in the AMJA. Reader utility rises with journal quality (Q) and falls
with time to publication (T ). Since both equilibrium values improve in the AMJA system
(according to (32) and (33)), we get:
ν∗C > ν˜C. (34)
Why do referees, editors, and authors choose higher values for e, |Lj |, qi and mi in the
AMJA system? If players increase their inputs voluntarily—based on a comparison of ex-
pected marginal utility and marginal costs of such an increase, it must be because they expect
higher induced utility in the AMJA system.
This conclusion is simple for editors and referees because they only gain—and do not
lose—utility in the AMJA system, i.e.,
ν∗j > ν˜j (35)
ν∗R > ν˜R. (36)
For authors, the AMJA is better only if additional induced utility exceeds additional disutil-
ity, i.e.,
ρ(m∗)[1 − α]πˆ (q∗) + (ui(T ∗) − ui(T˜ )) > φ. (37)
Thus, if the costs of posting a paper to the auction server (φ) are too high, authors will not
contribute. If authors differ (e.g., through heterogeneous abilities), they have different cost
functions (a(q,m)) for increasing paper quality and marketing, which results in different
levels of q∗ and m∗. To maximize participation, φ must be low enough to attract higher cost
authors.52
51For clarity reasons we denote the AMJA (CPS) equilibrium value of Q by Q∗ (Q˜) and will do the same
for other variables below. We are aware that those are not strategic variables in the strict sense.
52This insight opens an entire discussion on the potential goals (and welfare) of the academic community as
a whole: Is it better to encourage every author to post papers to the auction server by charging low φ—thus
allowing unsuccessful papers to subsidize more successful papers—or should a certain threshold for quality
of papers (and marketing efforts) be set indirectly by charging high φ?
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Finally, since author i spends a(m∗ > 0) > 0 voluntarily, the author trades loss for gain
while (37) holds.53 We conclude:
ν∗i > ν˜i , (38)
which allows us to state our main result:
Proposition 3 (Pareto-optimality) Consider (34) through (38). As long as the submission
fee to the auction server (φ) is sufficiently low, the equilibrium of the AMJA is strictly Pareto-
superior to the equilibrium of the CPS.
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